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Few issues in contemporary risk policy are as momentous or contentious as the precautionary principle. Since 
it first emerged in German environmental 
policy, it has been championed by envi-
ronmentalists and consumer protection 
groups, and resisted by the industries they 
oppose (Raffensperger & Tickner, 1999). 
Various versions of the principle now pro-
liferate across different national and inter-
national jurisdictions and policy areas 
(Fisher, 2002). From a guiding theme in 
European Commission (EC) environmen-
tal policy, it has become a general princi-
ple of EC law (CEC, 2000; Vos & Wendler, 
2006). Its influence has extended from the 
regulation of environmental, technological 
and health risks to the wider governance of 
science, innovation and trade (O’Riordan & 
Cameron, 1994).
An early classic formulation neatly 
encapsulates its key features. According 
to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development: “In 
order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capa-
bilities. Where there are threats of seri-
ous or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as 
a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental deg-
radation” (UN, 1992). This injunction has 
given rise to a wide range of criticisms: 
sound scientific techniques of risk assess-
ment already offer a comprehensive and 
rational set of ‘decision rules’ for use in 
policy (Byrd & Cothern, 2000); these sci-
ence-based approaches yield a robust and 
practically operational basis for decision-
making under uncertainty (Morris, 2000); 
the precautionary principle fails as a basis 
for any similar operational type of deci-
sion rule in its own right (Peterson, 2006); 
the precautionary principle is of practical 
relevance only in risk management, and 
not in risk assessment (CEC, 2000); and, if 
applied to assessment, the precautionary 
principle threatens a rejection of useful and 
well-established risk assessment techniques 
(Woteki, 2000).
Each of these involves strong assump-
tions about the nature and standing of sci-
entific rationality and rigour, the scope and 
character of uncertainty, the applicability 
and limits of risk assessment, and the par-
ticular implications of precaution. I hope to 
contribute to a more measured debate on 
these matters, and will briefly review each 
of these arguments in turn. In the process, I 
will explore more constructive ways to sat-
isfy imperatives for robustness, rationality, 
rigour and precaution.
Most criticism of the precautionary prin-
ciple is based on unfavourable comparisons 
with established ‘sound scientific’ methods 
in the governance of risk. These include a 
range of quantitative and/or expert-based 
risk-assessment techniques, involving vari-
ous forms of scientific experimentation and 
modelling, probability and statistical theory, 
cost–benefit and decision analysis, and 
Bayesian and Monte Carlo methods. These 
conventional methods are assumed—often 
implicitly—to offer a comprehensively rig-
orous basis for informing decision-making 
(Byrd & Cothern, 2000). In particular, they 
are held to provide decision rules that are 
applicable, appropriate and complete 
(Peterson, 2006). Therefore, when consider-
ing the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
the precautionary principle, we must also 
give equal attention to these conventional 
approaches to risk assessment.
All scientific approaches are based on the articulation of two fundamental parameters, which are then reduced 
to an aggregated concept of risk. First are 
things that might happen: hazards, possibil-
ities or outcomes. Second is the likelihood 
or probability associated with each. Either 
of these parameters might be subject to var-
iously complete or problematic knowledge, 
in ways that are outlined below. This yields 
four logical permutations of possible states 
of incomplete knowledge—of course, these 
are neither discrete nor mutually exclusive 
and typically occur together in varying 
degrees in the real world (Fig 1; Stirling, 
1999). Conventionally, risk assessment 
addresses each of these states essentially 
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by applying the same battery of techniques: 
quantifying and aggregating different out-
comes and multiplying by their respective 
probabilities to yield a single reductive 
picture of ‘risk’.
Fig 1 also provides examples of areas in 
which these possible states of knowledge 
might come to the fore in policy-making. In 
the top left of the matrix exist many fields in 
which past experience or scientific models 
are judged to foster high confidence in both 
the possible outcomes and their respective 
probabilities. In the strict sense of the term, 
this is the formal condition of risk and it is 
under these conditions that the conven-
tional techniques of risk assessment offer a 
scientifically rigorous approach. However, 
it is also clear that this formal definition of 
risk also implies circumstances of uncer-
tainty, ambiguity and ignorance under 
which the reductive techniques of risk 
assessment are not applicable.
Under the condition of uncertainty 
(Fig 1), we can characterize possible out-
comes, but the available information or 
analytical models do not present a definitive 
basis for assigning probabilities. It is under 
these conditions that “probability does not 
exist” (de Finetti, 1974). Of course, we can 
still exercise subjective judgements and 
treat these as a basis for systematic analy-
sis. However, the challenge of uncertainty 
is that such judgements might take several 
different—yet equally plausible—forms. 
Rather than reducing these to a single value 
or recommendation, the scientifically rigor-
ous approach is therefore to acknowledge 
various possible interpretations. The point 
remains that, under uncertainty, attempts to 
assert a single aggregated picture of risk are 
neither rational nor ‘science-based’.
Under the condition of ambiguity, it is 
not the probabilities but the possible out-
comes themselves that are problematic. 
This might be the case even for events 
that are certain or have occurred already 
(Wynne, 2002; Stirling, 2003).  For exam-
ple, in the regulation of genetically modi-
fied (GM) food, such ambiguities arise over 
ecological, agronomic, safety, economic 
or social criteria of harm (Stirling & Mayer, 
1999). When faced with such questions 
over “contradictory certainties” (Thompson 
& Warburton, 1985), rational choice theory 
has shown that analysis alone is unable to 
guarantee definitive answers (Arrow, 1963). 
Where there is ambiguity, reduction to a 
single ‘sound scientific’ picture of risk is 
also neither rigorous nor rational.
Finally, there is the condition of igno-
rance. Here, neither probabilities nor 
outcomes can be fully characterized 
(Collingridge, 1980). Ignorance differs from 
uncertainty, which focuses on agreed, 
known parameters such as carcinogenicity 
or flood damage. It also differs from ambi-
guity in that the parameters are not only 
contestable but also—at least in part—
unknown. Some of the most important 
Fig 1 | Contrasting states of incomplete knowledge, with schematic examples. TSE, transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathy.
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Fig 2 | Practical limits to robustness in risk assessment. Results were obtained from 63 detailed risk–benefit 
and cost–benefit comparative studies of electricity supply. Based on data from Sundqvist et al, 2004. 
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environmental issues were—at their out-
set—of this kind (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 
1990). In the early histories of stratospheric 
ozone depletion, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy and endocrine-disrupting 
chemicals, for example, the initial problem 
was not so much divergent expert views or 
mistakes over probability, but straightfor-
ward ignorance about the possibilities them-
selves. Again, it is irrational to represent 
ignorance as risk.
The picture summarized in Fig 1 is 
intrinsic to the scientific definition of risk 
itself and is therefore difficult to refute in 
these terms. Risk assessment offers a pow-
erful suite of methods under a strict state 
of risk. However, these are not applicable 
under conditions of uncertainty, ambigu-
ity and ignorance. Contrary to the impres-
sion given in calls for ‘science-based’ risk 
assessment, persistent adherence to these 
reductive methods, under conditions other 
than the strict state of risk, are irrational, 
unscientific and potentially misleading.
From these fundamental issues of scien-tific rigour follow implications for the practical robustness of conventional, 
reductive risk assessment in decision-
making. In political terms, a quantitative 
expression of risk or a definitive expert judge-
ment on safety is typically of great instru-
mental value; however, these have little to 
do with scientific rationality. Any robust pol-
icy must go beyond short-term institutional 
issues and address the efficacy of policy 
outcomes. As such, robustness is a function 
of the accuracy of assessment results, not of 
their professed precision. This question of 
accuracy is more difficult to establish, but 
some impression can be obtained by look-
ing across a range of comparable studies. 
Here, a rather striking picture emerges that 
underscores and compounds the theoretical 
challenges discussed above.
Nowhere are reductive, science-based 
approaches to risk more mature, sophisti-
cated and elaborate than in energy policy. 
It is here that the greatest efforts have been 
expended over long periods to conduct 
comprehensive comparative assessments 
across a full range of policy options. These 
have influenced areas of policy-making 
such as climate change, nuclear power and 
nuclear waste. However, the apparently 
precise findings by specific studies typi-
cally understate the enormous variability 
inherent in the literature as a whole (Fig 2; 
Sundqvist et al, 2004).
This understatement of variability and 
uncertainty is not restricted to formal 
quantitative analysis. Fig 3 shows various 
judgements from experts who advised the 
UK government on the regulation of GM 
technology in the late 1990s. By using a 
method called multi-criteria mapping, 
individual respondents express their judge-
ments in quasi-quantitative graphical terms 
(Stirling & Mayer, 1999). The results reveal 
starkly contrasting understandings of the 
relative merits of GM when compared with 
other agricultural strategies. Despite the 
fact that the government advisory commit-
tees typically represented their collective 
judgements as precise prescriptive recom-
mendations, it is clear that the underly-
ing individual expert perspectives display 
significantly greater diversity.
The reason that these ‘sound scientific’ 
procedures yield such contrasting pictures 
of risk is that the answers delivered in risk 
assessment typically depend on how the 
analysis is ‘framed’. Many factors can 
org Organic agricultural methods
ipm Integrated pest management
cnv Conventional intensive farming
gm1 with segregation & labelling
gm2 with monitoring
gm3 with voluntary control
Academic scientists Key
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
Government advisers
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
Public interest
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
Industry
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
org
ipm
cnv
gm1
gm2
gm3
High
risk
Low
risk
Each chart shows risk rankings 
on a subjective interval scale of 
‘performance’
Fig 3 | Divergent specialist judgements on risk. Figure adapted from Stirling & Gee, 2002.
Table 1 | A selection of factors influencing the 
framing of scientific risk assessment
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Recruiting expertise
Commissioning research
Constituting ‘proof ’
Exploring sensitivities
Interpreting results
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influence the framing of science for pol-
icy, which can lead to radically divergent 
answers to apparently straightforward ques-
tions (Table 1). The point is not that scien-
tific discipline carries no value. For any 
particular framing conditions, scientific 
procedures offer important ways to make 
analysis more systematic, transparent, 
accountable and reproducible. The issue is 
not that ‘anything goes’, but rather that, in 
complex areas, science-based techniques 
rarely deliver a single robust set of findings. 
To paraphrase an apocryphal remark by 
Winston Churchill, the message is that sci-
ence is essential, but that it should remain 
“on tap, not on top” (Lindsay, 1995).
So what does this mean for the pre-cautionary principle? As already mentioned, its criticisms are typi-
cally founded on unfavourable compari-
sons with ‘sound scientific’ methods of risk 
assessment. The preceding discussion has 
shown that—for all their strengths under 
strict conditions of ‘risk’—these techniques 
are neither rational and rigorous nor practi-
cally robust under conditions of uncertainty, 
ambiguity and ignorance. It is on this basis 
that we might already see the value of the 
precautionary principle as a salutary spur 
to greater humility. However, there remain 
some significant questions. Does precaution 
offer greater or lesser rigour when formu-
lating decision rules under uncertainty? In 
what ways and to what extent might these 
be considered more or less robust than 
conventional methods of risk assessment?
The precautionary principle is not—and 
cannot properly claim to be—a complete 
decision rule at all. Unlike many of the 
techniques with which it is compared, 
it is, as its name suggests, more a general 
principle than a specific methodology. In 
other words, it does not of itself purport to 
provide a detailed protocol for deriving a 
precise understanding of relative risks and 
uncertainties, much less justify particular 
detailed decisions. Instead, it provides a 
general normative guide to the effect that 
policy-making under uncertainty, ambigu-
ity and ignorance should give the benefit 
of the doubt to the protection of human 
health and the environment, rather than 
to competing organizational or economic 
interests. This, in turn, holds important 
implications for the level of proof required 
to sustain an argument, the placing of the 
burden of persuasion and the allocation of 
responsibility for resourcing the gathering 
of evidence, and the performance of analy-
sis. This is useful because none of these are 
matters on which there can be a uniquely 
firm ‘sound scientific’ position.
Beyond this broad normative guidance, 
however, the procedural implications of 
the precautionary principle certainly do 
not compare with the detailed specifica-
tions of reductive methodologies. Instead, 
the precautionary principle is now more 
comparable with the general principles of 
rational choice that underlie these particu-
lar methods. Interestingly, these underly-
ing principles of ‘sound science’ are rarely 
explicitly enunciated, but instead implic-
itly assumed to be intrinsic to rationality. 
Examples include the quantification of 
likelihood using probabilities, the assump-
tion of multiplicative relationships between 
probability and magnitude, an insistence 
on the universality of trade-offs, and an 
imperative to aggregate social preferences. 
Although not exposed to the same policy 
scrutiny as precaution, each of these is—as 
we have seen—contestable. Indeed, under 
conditions of uncertainty, ambiguity or 
ignorance, none is applicable.
It is under these more intractable states of incertitude that the precautionary principle comes into its own (Stirling, 
2003). The value here is not as a tightly pre-
scriptive decision rule—by definition, that 
is not scientifically possible under these 
conditions. Instead, the precautionary prin-
ciple draws attention to a broader range of 
non-reductive methods, which avoid spuri-
ous promises to determine ‘science-based’ 
policy (Fig 4; Stirling, 2006). The intention 
is not to imply a neat one-to-one mapping 
of specific methods to individual states 
of knowledge, but rather to illustrate the 
rich variety of alternatives that exist if risk 
assessment is not properly applicable. 
In this light, we can appreciate that the 
real failure as a decision rule is not that of 
the precautionary principle but the aspi-
ration to a reductive, ‘science-based’ risk 
assessment beyond the narrow confines of 
risk itself. If we seek simple rules to remove 
the need for subjectivity, argument, delib-
eration and politics, then precaution offers 
no such promise. Instead, it points to a rich 
array of methods that reveal the intrinsi-
cally normative and contestable basis for 
decisions, and the different ways in which 
our knowledge is incomplete. This is as 
Fig 4 | Methodological responses to different forms of incertitude.
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good a ‘rule’ for decision-making as we 
can reasonably get.
What is interesting about these impli-
cations of the precautionary principle is 
that they refute the often-repeated injunc-
tion—even at the highest levels of policy-
making (CEC, 2000)—that precaution 
is relevant to risk management but not 
risk assessment. Various methodological 
responses to uncertainty, ambiguity and 
ignorance present alternative approaches 
(Fig 4). Of course, each might be seen as a 
complement to risk assessment, rather than 
as a potential substitute. The point is that 
insisting that precaution relates only to risk 
management entirely misses its real value 
in highlighting more diverse ways to gather 
relevant knowledge.
Policy understandings of precaution are now moving away from rigid ideas of a decision rule that is appli-
cable only in risk management, towards 
more broad processes of social appraisal 
(Table 2; ESTO, 1999; Gee et al, 2001). In 
many ways, these qualities are simply com-
mon sense. In an ideal world, they would 
and could apply equally to the application 
of risk assessment. However, the incorpo-
ration of all these qualities as routine fea-
tures would be prohibitively demanding of 
evidence, analysis, time and money. The 
question therefore arises as to how to iden-
tify those cases in which it is justifiable to 
adopt these approaches.
The answer to this question is clearly 
stated in the precautionary principle itself. 
Since its canonical formulation in the Rio 
Declaration, precaution has been iden-
tified specifically as a response to ‘lack 
of scientific certainty’, when there is a 
threat of serious or irreversible harm. As 
we have seen, this undifferentiated idea 
of incertitude might be further partitioned 
more accurately into strict uncertainty, 
ambiguity and ignorance. Either way, the 
practical implications are clear. In call-
ing for more rigorous approaches to these 
states of incertitude, precaution need in 
no sense be seen as a blanket rejection 
of risk assessment. Under conditions in 
which uncertainty, ambiguity and igno-
rance are judged not to present significant 
challenges, the elegant reductive methods 
of risk assessment are powerful tools to 
inform decision-making.
Fig 5 provides a general framework for 
the effective articulation of conventional 
risk assessment with the broader qualities 
and associated methods of the precaution-
ary principle (Klinke & Renn, 2002; Renn 
et al, 2003; Stirling et al, 2006; Klinke et 
al, 2006). Just as current risk assessment is 
preceded by hazard characterization, so 
this framework uses a criteria-based screen-
ing process to identify crucial attributes of 
scientific uncertainty, or social or political 
Fig 5 | A framework for articulating precaution and risk assessment. Figure adapted from Stirling et al, 2006.
Table 2 | Key features of a precautionary appraisal process (after Gee et al, 2001)
Precaution ‘broadens out’ the inputs to appraisal beyond the scope that is typical in conventional 
regulatory risk assessment, in order to provide for the following points.
(i) Independence from vested institutional, disciplinary, economic and political interests 
(ii) Examination of a greater range of uncertainties, sensitivities and possible scenarios
(iii) Deliberate search for ‘blind spots’, gaps in knowledge and divergent scientific views
(iv) Attention to proxies for possible harm, i.e. mobility, bioaccumulation and persistence
(v) Contemplation of full life cycles and resource chains as they occur in the real world
(vi) Consideration of indirect effects, such as additivity, synergy and accumulation
(vii) Inclusion of industrial trends, institutional behaviour and issues of non-compliance
(viii) Explicit discussion over appropriate burdens of proof, persuasion, evidence and analysis 
(ix) Comparison of a series of technology and policy options and potential substitutes
(x) Deliberation over justifications and possible wider benefits, as well as risks and costs
(xi) Drawing on relevant knowledge and experience arising beyond specialist disciplines
(xii) Engagement with the values and interests of all stakeholders who stand to be affected
(xiii) General citizen participation in order to provide independent validation of framing
(xiv) A shift from theoretical modelling towards systematic monitoring and surveillance
(xv) A greater priority on targeted scientific research to address unresolved questions
(xvi) Initiation at the earliest stages ‘upstream’ in an innovation, strategy or policy process
(xvii) Emphasis on strategic qualities such as reversibility, flexibility, diversity and resilience
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ambiguity (Table 3). When none of these 
criteria is triggered, then the case in ques-
tion is subject to conventional risk assess-
ment. Only when there is uncertainty or 
ambiguity does the process initiate a more 
elaborate precautionary appraisal or delib-
erative process. Current work is refining 
the specific methodological, institutional 
and legal implications in the area of food 
safety (Stirling et al, 2006).
Of course, from any point of view, 
the devil will always be in the detail. 
However, the main points to make here 
are the following. First, the framework 
as a whole is itself precautionary, in that 
attention is given to ambiguity, uncertainty 
and ignorance. The default response to a 
certain, unambiguously serious threat is 
the immediate presumption of preventive 
measures. Second, the framework does 
not necessarily imply that the adoption 
of precaution will automatically entail 
any particular measure, such as bans or 
phase-outs. Third, the framework shows 
how adoption of the precautionary princi-
ple need not imply a blanket rejection of 
risk assessment, still less of science itself. 
Instead, it involves a carefully measured 
and targeted treatment of different states of 
knowledge. In this sense, this precaution-
ary framework might be seen as more rig-
orous and rational—and potentially more 
robust—than the indiscriminate use of 
often-inapplicable methods.
This article began with a series of concerns about the precautionary principle. Taking each in turn, I have 
shown that the ‘sound scientific’ methods 
of risk assessment—with which precau-
tion is often compared—do not offer an 
unqualified rational, rigorous or robust 
basis for decision-making under uncer-
tainty, ambiguity or ignorance. It is true 
that the precautionary principle also fails 
as a source of complete prescriptive ‘deci-
sion rules’ under these challenging condi-
tions. However, this failure is less acute in 
the case of precaution because prescriptive 
‘decision rules’ are neither the aim nor the 
claim of this general guidance.
Although falling short of prescriptive 
decision rules, the precautionary principle 
does suggest a range of more modest, open-
ended, but nonetheless highly effective 
methodologies and general qualities, 
which offer ways to complement and 
improve on conventional risk assessment. 
As such, it is clear that—contrary to com-
mon assertions—the precautionary princi-
ple is of practical relevance as much to risk 
assessment as to risk management. 
Precaution does not automatically entail 
bans and phase-outs, but instead calls for 
deliberate and comprehensive attention 
to contending policy or technology path-
ways. Far from being in tension with 
science, precaution offers a way to be more 
measured and rational about uncertainty, 
ambiguity and ignorance.
Of course, there remain unresolved 
issues. Precautionary appraisal is inherently 
comparative; therefore it is as likely to spur 
favoured directions for innovation as to 
inhibit those that are disfavoured. Here, we 
can expect—and should welcome—con-
tinuing criticism, concern and debate 
through open policy discourse and demo-
cratic accountability. What is not tenable is 
that these inherently political issues be con-
cealed behind opaque, deterministic ideas 
of the role of science. In prompting more 
rational, balanced and measured under-
standings of ‘sound science’ rhetorics on 
uncertainty, precaution has arguably made 
its greatest contribution.
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Table 3 | Illustrative criteria of seriousness, uncertainty and ambiguity (after Stirling et al, 2006)
Criteria of seriousness
Clear evidence of carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, or reprotoxicity in components/residues
Clear evidence of virulent pathogens
Clear violation of risk-based concentration thresholds or standards
Criteria of uncertainty and ignorance
Scientifically founded doubts on theory
Scientific doubts on model sufficiency or applicability
Scientific doubts on data quality or applicability
Novel, unprecedented features of the product
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